Encryption and steganography of synthetic gene circuits by Purcell, Oliver et al.
ARTICLE
Encryption and steganography of synthetic
gene circuits
Oliver Purcell 1, Jerry Wang1, Piro Siuti1 & Timothy K. Lu1,2,3
Synthetic biologists use artiﬁcial gene circuits to control and engineer living cells. As engi-
neered cells become increasingly commercialized, it will be desirable to protect the intel-
lectual property contained in these circuits. Here, we introduce strategies to hide the design
of synthetic gene circuits, making it more difﬁcult for an unauthorized third party to deter-
mine circuit structure and function. We present two different approaches: the ﬁrst uses
encryption by overlapping uni-directional recombinase sites to scramble circuit topology and
the second uses steganography by adding genes and interconnections to obscure circuit
topology. We also discuss a third approach: to use synthetic genetic codes to mask the
function of synthetic circuits. For each approach, we discuss relative strengths, weaknesses,
and practicality of implementation, with the goal to inspire further research into this
important and emerging area.
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A central goal of synthetic biology is to design and con-struct synthetic gene circuits that can be used to engineernovel functions into living organisms1,2. Successfully
engineering synthetic gene circuits is resource and labor intensive
and the corresponding intellectual property (IP) is valuable.
However, DNA sequencing technology is now at a stage where
the genome of an engineered cell can be sequenced cheaply and
quickly, thus allowing the designs of synthetic circuits or path-
ways performing the critical functions to be readily determined.
New methods to protect the IP contained within these organisms,
beyond legal remedies, are therefore needed. While this is a
recognized problem, to date there has only been limited research
into possible solutions3,4.
Here, we present two methods for hiding the design of syn-
thetic genetic circuits: encryption of the circuit design by
scrambling circuit topology using uni-directional recombinases
(“circuit scrambling”) and obscuring circuit topology using
additional circuit “dummy” components (“circuit camouﬂage”),
an application of steganography. We also brieﬂy discuss masking
circuit function using synthetic genetic codes (“circuit re-encod-
ing”), which is still in early stages of feasibility but has potential
utility. Here, topology is deﬁned by functional interactions
between components in a genetic circuit. The aim of these
approaches is to make it more difﬁcult for unauthorized third
parties to uncover the structure and function of a given artiﬁcial
gene circuit. We demonstrate experimental proof-of-concepts for
both recombinase scrambling and circuit camouﬂage, and discuss
circuit re-encoding, which remains technically challenging.
Results
Circuit scrambling. Circuit scrambling is an approach to encrypt
the topology of a genetic circuit, either in vitro or in vivo (i.e.,
within an engineered cell), which would offer protection when the
circuit is being stored or transferred between parties. Circuit
scrambling can be achieved through the use of site-speciﬁc uni-
directional recombinases, such as large serine recombinases, that
recognize speciﬁc DNA sequences known as attB and attP sites5.
If these recombinase-recognition sites (RRS) are placed on the
same piece of DNA, the cognate recombinase will cause a one-
time recombination event between the RRS, resulting in inversion
or excision of the DNA between the RRS, depending on their
relative orientation6,7. Such recombination events can then be
used to scramble the topology of a circuit when it is not in use,
which is useful since the behavior of a gene circuit is largely
determined by its topology and the biochemical properties of
the components.
To demonstrate circuit scrambling using recombinases, we
use transcriptional circuits as an example. Here, the topology of
transcriptional circuits is determined by speciﬁc promoter-gene
pairings, where promoters express genes encoding transcription
factors, and each promoter can be regulated by one or more
transcription factors. A process that can deterministically
“scramble” and “unscramble” these pairings would allow for
encryption and decryption of the circuit topology, resulting in
non-functional or functional circuits, respectively.
Uni-directional recombinases provide a means of determinis-
tically scrambling and unscrambling circuit topology by physi-
cally re-structuring the DNA. Figure 1 illustrates a proof-of-
concept of the encryption process for a genetic AND gate. The
AND gate is comprised of three genes, organized linearly on a
stretch of DNA (Fig. 1a). The gate is scrambled using an iterative
two-step process: (1) a section of DNA is chosen such that at least
one end is between a promoter and its gene and that section is
inverted, and (2) RRS ﬂanking the inverted region are introduced
into the sequence. Multiple sets of RRS can be introduced in this
way to scramble the circuit (Fig. 1b). The scrambled circuit can
then be synthesized or assembled in vitro. Unscrambling (Fig. 2a)
requires applying the same set of the recombinases that were
used for the scrambling process in a restricted set of orderings
(an analysis of this for the AND gate is discussed later). By
overlapping pairs of recombinase sites corresponding to different
recombinases, order dependency is introduced into the unscram-
bling process. The order-dependent application of uni-directional
recombinases has been used previously in the construction of
genetic logic circuits1,8, while bi-directional recombinases have
been used to “decompress” a single genetic circuit structure into
an equilibrium of more than one structure9.
Circuit scrambling can be substantially strengthened using
decoys. Decoys are genetic elements that are present within
the scrambled construct, and could conceivably be a part of
functional circuit, but are not actually required for the circuit’s
function. Decoys introduce additional uncertainty as to what the
actual topology of the functional circuit is, making cracking
the scrambled circuit harder. The possibility of decoy genes
permits excision events to be incorporated into the unscrambling
process, thus preventing excision from being an indication of
incorrect unscrambling. The AND gate scrambling example
illustrates the use of a decoy promoter-gene pair and decoy RRS
(Fig. 1b). The decoy promoter-gene pair pD and ORF D
corresponds to pLtet0-1 and tetR, which could be plausible
elements of the functional circuit. The decoy RRS are those that
are recognized by recombinase PhiC31. In this example,
recombination with PhiC31 is not needed for the correct
unscrambling, and if used would result in a deletion of the
majority of the circuit components, leaving only the ORFs tetR
and gfp remaining. The resulting circuit would not perform the
correct AND gate function.
We experimentally implemented an example of circuit
scrambling and unscrambling in Figs. 1, 2 in vitro. It should
also be possible to carry out this process on circuits encoded
within cells1,10,11. Starting with a plasmid containing the
scrambled construct, we unscrambled the construct through
successive rounds of in vitro treatment with different puriﬁed
recombinases. At each round, plasmids were transformed into
E. coli and recombined constructs were selected. In future work,
this protocol could be optimized so that successive recombina-
tion, transformation, and selection events would not be necessary.
Brute-force cracking of recombinase-scrambled constructs
could be achieved either by (1) constructing all possible circuits
based on the promoters and genes present, or (2) trying all
possible orders and identities of the recombinases. In either case,
the identity of the true circuit must still be established from the
resulting collection of potential topologies. . Additionally, decoys
mean that a third party must estimate which elements are actual
circuit components to avoid a ﬁnal circuit with incorrect
components.
A more systematic approach to cracking the scrambled
circuit is to enumerate all possible DNA states obtainable
from the different orderings of the recombinases, and then
evaluate the states for how likely they are to be the true circuit.
We enumerated all possible recombinase decryption orders
(
Pk¼4
k¼1
n!
nkð Þ! ¼ 64)12, where n is the total number of recombinases
and k is the number of recombinases used in a possible
decryption, for the encrypted AND gate (Supplementary
Figure 1). It has been formally proven elsewhere that when using
a single RRS pair per recombinase, n recombinases can produce at
most 2n unique DNA states11 (including the state where no
recombinases are used). Furthermore, different orderings of the
same set of recombinases can lead to the same DNA state11.
In practice, not all orderings of recombinases are productive
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because an excision event may remove other recombination sites,
which cannot then be used in subsequent steps. However, because
any ordering of the same set of recombinases leads to the same
DNA state, all orderings have to be unavailable for the state to be
unreachable. For the AND gate, n= 4 and 2n= 16, and although
excision events only permit 35 of the possible 64 recombinase
orderings to have a productive effect (one where every
recombinase in the set has an effect on the DNA state) on the
DNA state when performed (Supplementary Figure 1), we ﬁnd
that all 16 states are reachable. Two of these states are identical,
owing to nested excision events. Due to occurrences of this type
of redundancy, while the number of unique DNA states that can
be reached may typically be less than 2n, it may not be
subtantially less.
Thus, an attacker would be presented with a list of possible
unique circuit candidates, which even if only numbering in the
low hundreds (e.g., 28= 256) may include many plausible
candidates. In the case of the AND gate, despite its small size,
many of the 15 DNA states (16 including the encrypted state) are
plausible conﬁgurations of promoter-ORF pairings and circuits
(supplementary Figure 1). Further examination of these conﬁg-
urations suggests ways in which to increase the diversity and the
number of connections in these incorrect circuits, thus making
them appear more plausible. For instance, using different variants
of pLtetO-1 for pB and pD would differentiate between some
conﬁgurations, adding a promoter permanently (i.e., with no
recombinases sites between the promoter and ORF so that this
relationship is never broken) driving tetR expression would
introduce tetR links into many conﬁgurations, and either making
pC bi-directional or more simply adding in an opposing
promoter would in many cases express lacI and introduce a
feedback loop. None of these additions would affect the topology
of the correct decrypted AND gate, although there could be a
quantitative effect of making pC bi-directional. Finally, in this
example, the correct AND gate circuit is far simpler (e.g., contains
no unused promoters or ORFs, and has a single promoter per
gene, with all promoter-gene pairings in the same direction) than
many of the other candidate states. In practice, the correct circuit
should be designed to look comparably unstructured as the other
candidates so that it does not stand out.
Practical implementation of this approach is limited by the
number, orthogonality, and efﬁciencies of available recombinases.
For example, 11 recombinases have been demonstrated to be
largely highly orthogonal to each other13, and more could be
discovered through further mining. Three of the recombinases
display low levels of cross-talk with a single other recognition site
in addition to their own. The orthogonality of the set of
recombinases used is therefore important as cross-talk would lead
to incorrect recombination events. If necessary cross-talk could
likely be reduced by engineering and directed evolution.
Recombinase efﬁciencies can affect the time required for
successful decryption, as well as the overall decryption efﬁciency.
Inducer 1
Inducer 1
Inducer 2
Inducer 2
pA
pA
b
a
pB pCA B C
pA pB pCB
pA pCD C
D
B ApD
pA pBA CB pD DpC
pA pBA CB pD pC D
pD
pB
A C
1st scrambling layer
2nd scrambling layer
3rd scrambling layer
4th scrambling layer Decoy recombinase sites
ENCRYPTED
Decoy promoter-gene
A lacI
IPTG
proD
gfp
pLac/ara-1
Arabinose
araC
pLtetO-1
CpCCAND
pB B
Fig. 1 Encryption of a genetic AND gate using circuit scrambling. a Genetic AND gate. A, B, C ORFs encoding lacI, araC, and gfp, respectively. pA, pB, and pC
are the promoters proD, pLtetO-1, and pLac/ara-1, respectively. Inducer 1 (IPTG) inhibits transcriptional repression by LacI, and Inducer 2 (arabinose)
activates transcription by AraC. This circuit was tested in cells that do not express the TetR repressor so that pLtetO-1 is constitutively active. b Encryption
of the AND gate. At each step, either a new set of recombination sites (decoy or not) or decoy promoter-gene pairs is added. Promoter pD and ORF D are
pLtetO-1 and tetR, respectively. Recombinase sites denoted by triangles, brackets, square brackets, and semi-circles are recognized by recombinases TP01,
BxbI, Int3, and PhiC31, respectively
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For example, Bxb1 has been shown to recombine 90% of sites in
2 h in vitro14. Assuming this rate holds for other recombinases,
a decryption using ﬁve recombinases would be expected to
have a combined efﬁciency of 0.95 ~ 60%. Allowing recombinase
reactions to run longer or performing evolution on
the recombinases to improve their activity could help to mitigate
these problems.
The recombinase reactions described here are uni-directional
and do not permit reversibility unless they are used together with
recombinase directionality factors15. This is acceptable for current
applications, as engineered cells are often single-use and are
rarely retrieved and used again. In future applications this may
change, and thus re-scrambling may be useful. An example may
be a ﬁeld application outside of a research laboratory, where
maintaining a bank of frozen stocks for long periods of time is
not possible. It would then be useful to maintain a single bank of
cells for an extended period of time, unscrambling the circuit
when the cells need to be used, and then re-scrambling the circuit
afterwards. In addition, re-scrambling is also interesting as it
poses technical and conceptual challenges. Next, we introduce an
approach to obscuring circuits that is reversible.
Circuit camouﬂage. Unlike circuit scrambling, circuit camouﬂage
maintains the topology of the true circuit, but makes this topol-
ogy hard to determine. This is achieved by embedding the
functional circuit within a larger “camouﬂaging” circuit (Fig. 3), a
form of steganography. A similar strategy is employed in inte-
grated circuit (IC) design16–18, whereby additional dummy con-
tacts between conducting layers are added so from the top-view
(the view from which microscopy can be used to uncover the
circuit design) the design of the circuit is not easily identiﬁable. In
our approach de-camouﬂaging uses a molecular “key” to subtract
the effects of the camouﬂaging genes from the functional circuit
so that it can operate properly. In the implementation discussed
here, this is achieved by repressing the expression of the
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Fig. 2 Decryption of the genetic AND gate. a Unscrambling of the scrambled AND gate from Fig. 1. Behavior of constructs from each stage of the
unscrambling is shown. N= 3, error bars represent standard deviation. The ﬁnal unscrambled construct (step 4) demonstrates AND gate behavior,
whereas intermediate steps show non-AND gate behavior. b An example of an incorrect unscrambling. RiboJ sequences34 were used directly upstream of
the RBS of each gene to prevent any interference from the increased size of the 5′UTRs (RiboJ54, RiboJ51, RiboJ53 and RiboJ, for araC, lacI, tetR, and gfp
respectively). NoInd = no inducer, Arab = arabinose
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-07144-7
4 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |          (2018) 9:4942 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-07144-7 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
camouﬂaging genes. As most repression mechanisms are rever-
sible, de-camouﬂaging can be transient and the circuit can be re-
camouﬂaged by removing the repressive modalities.
Figure 4 demonstrates an in vivo proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of circuit camouﬂage on a bi-stable switch circuit19.
Figure 4a shows the bi-stable switch topology that relies on cross-
repression by tetR and lacI, and its bi-stability in terms of a GFP
output. To camouﬂage the circuit, we added two additional
genes to the circuit, araC and λCI (Fig. 4b). By modifying the
promoter driving tetR to include a binding site for λCI, λCI
can bind to the promoters of the bi-stable switch, and in concert
with activation of λCI expression by AraC, perturb its function
by destroying the toggle switch behavior. To uncamouﬂage the
circuit, we transformed in a plasmid containing constitutively
expressed dCas9, along with two constitutively expressed guide
RNAs targeting the ORFs of araC and λCI, which together form
a “CRISPR key”. The CRISPR key repressed expression of araC
and λCI through CRISPR interference, leaving the uncamouﬂaged
and functioning bi-stable switch (Fig. 4b). The plasmid contained
the temperature-sensitive origin repA101ts from pDK46, which
is stable at 30 °C but unstable at 42 °C, and the ampicillin
resistance marker. By growing the cells on solid media at 42 °C
overnight without selection, the plasmid was removed, thus re-
camouﬂaging the circuit by making it lose its functionality due
to the effects of the camouﬂaging genes.
Cracking the camouﬂaging by brute force requires ﬁnding all
possible sub-circuits of the camouﬂaged circuit and determining
the correct one. Using a molecular key that can target speciﬁc
genes, the number of possible sub-circuits is 2n where n is the
total number of genes within the camouﬂaged circuit. This is a
numerically comparable scheme to the number of unscrambling
routes for circuit scrambling. However, deciding which of these
2n circuits is the true circuit is likely more difﬁcult than with
circuit scrambling. This is because promoters and ORFs are
always paired in circuit camouﬂage, in comparison to circuit
scrambling where both the promoter-ORF combination that
expresses the transcription factor and the promoter-ORF that
the transcription factor regulates have to be paired for the link
to be plausible. This means that the universe of plausible circuit
candidates from circuit camouﬂage will be larger and more highly
connected on average than from circuit scrambling. If speciﬁc
links can be targeted instead of only speciﬁc genes, the
camouﬂaging can be strengthened, as there are typically more
regulatory links than genes. There is no known simple
mechanism that can discriminate between regulatory links from
the same genes, but differentially blocking transcription factor
access to different promoters may be one strategy. For example,
targeting a unique site that overlaps an activator-binding site
could allow blocking of the activator binding to one promoter
that contains the unique site but not another that does not
contain the unique site. The same approach could work for
eukaryotic repressors binding upstream of the core promoter.
For an ideal camouﬂaging scheme, the circuit should not
display the correct qualitative and quantitative behavior when an
incorrect key is used. We examined the behavior of our circuit
under incorrect keys to understand the different classes of
behaviors that might result in a general case. In Fig. 5, the number
of possible gRNA targets (anywhere there is an NGG for S.
pyogenes dCas9) is given below each promoter and ORF. The
numbers for promoters are exact, while for ORFs they are
estimated to be the length of the ORF in bp divided by 16 (the
random probability of getting NGG in a triplet (CCN, which
corresponds to NGG in the bottom strand, was not considered).
The total number is 235, giving a total number of gRNA
combinations of 2^235 ~ 1070. While each of the 1070 combina-
tions could be a potential key, for tractability we considered only
one gRNA for each ORF as a potential key member. For the
promoters, we considered only gRNAs that overlap with the core
promoter region, and chose all of them to overlap the -10 region.
This gives a set of 7 gRNAs that may form part of the correct key,
labeled a-g on Fig. 3, for a total of 2^7= 128 combinations, or
127 if the no-gRNA combination is excluded. As a further
simpliﬁcation, we only examined combinations of at most 3
gRNAs, speciﬁcally a subset of these that illustrates the likely
outcomes of using an incorrect key (Fig. 5). There were a range of
qualitative and quantitative effects of using an incorrect key,
when compared to the correct switch behavior (Fig. 4b, panel 2):
The combinations a+ b, a+ b + g, and e+ b gave outputs that
were qualitatively different than switch behavior. Combinations
c and c+ d resulted in quantitatively different switch or switch-
like behavior. Combination b+ f yielded comparable switch
behavior. Combination e+ f resulted in comparable switch
behavior but unreliably (not all repeats performed the same,
also observed for a+ b). These four behaviors: (1) no practical
difference from the encrypted circuit (b+ f), (2) quantitatively
different from the correctly decrypted circuit (c and c+ d),
(3) qualitatively different from the correctly decrypted circuit
(a+ b, a+ f+ g, and e+ b), and (4) quantitatively equivalent to
the correctly decrypted circuit but inconsistent (e+ f) cover the
possible scenarios that could be seen in the general case.
Although most of the circuits that have been described in
literature are proof-of-concept systems, their eventual use will be
in the precise control of engineered cells and organisms, where
the quantitative relationship between input and output is vital.
Examples include cell classiﬁers for cancer20 where false negative
and positive rates are determined by quantitative circuit behavior,
and engineered probiotics that sense biomarker levels and titrate
the expression of therapeutic compounds to speciﬁc doses.
Therefore, hiding the quantitative behavior of a circuit may be
just as important as hiding the qualitative behavior.
While the topology of the correct circuit is destroyed in circuit
scrambling, the topology can remain intact with circuit camou-
ﬂage. The ratio of camouﬂage genes to true circuit genes is
therefore important—the lower this ratio, the more likely that
randomly selecting a connected sub-circuit will give you a part of
the true circuit. As with circuit scrambling, circuit camouﬂage
does not offer protection when the circuit has been uncamou-
ﬂaged and is in use, although the point of weakness differs. For
circuit scrambling, the vulnerability is the ability to sequence
the unscrambled construct, while with circuit camouﬂage the
vulnerability is the ability to obtain the molecular key when it is
in the cell. Using other types of molecular keys that are either
Remove molecular
key
Add molecular
key
Uncamouflaged circuitCamouflaged circuit
Fig. 3 Circuit camouﬂage. The red nodes denote genes of the correct circuit
while the blue nodes are the genes of the camouﬂaging circuit. The addition
of a “molecular key” represses or removes the effects of genes of the
camouﬂaging circuit that are incident on the correct circuit, leaving the
correct circuit to function. Only nodes repressed by the molecular key and
that are only incident on the correct circuit have been removed in the
uncamouﬂaged circuit. Nodes targeted by the key but which still have an
incident node from the correct circuit have been kept, as these nodes will
act as a sink for the proteins from the correct circuit
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Fig. 4 Camouﬂaging and uncamouﬂaging of a bi-stable switch using circuit camouﬂage. a The bi-stable switch is formed from tetR and lacI repressing each
other. GFP serves as a reporter. b The additional genes araC and λCI interconnect with the circuit and camouﬂage it by changing the topology and
interfering with its function. The addition of the CRISPR key represses expression of araC and λCI, uncamouﬂaging the switch. The dynamics of the
uncamouﬂaged switch are comparable to the circuit without the addition of camouﬂaging genes. Removal of the CRISPR key re-camouﬂages the switch.
Flow cytometry data shows the GFP output of the switch. Cells induced with+ aTc are represented as red histograms, cells induced with+ IPTG are
represented as blue histograms. Each stage was performed in triplicate—each histogram represents one biological replicate. Additional histograms at the
uncamouﬂaging stage are negative controls (see Methods for details)
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naturally transient, or difﬁcult to detect against the cellular
background may minimize this weakness. Examples include
directly delivering small RNAs that are typically quickly removed
by the cell, or a set of compounds that are quickly metabolized.
In each case, without a frequent supply of the key, the circuit
would become quickly re-camouﬂaged.
Traditionally, metabolic engineering has used permanent
genetic modiﬁcation to optimize production of target com-
pounds, such as mutations in speciﬁc regulatory sequences or
genes to alter their functions. CRISPRi has recently been used to
engineer the metabolism of the industrially important Corynbac-
terium glutamicium by repressing genes instead of deleting
them21. This approach may permit more precise tuning of the
host metabolism, allowing conﬁgurations of the metabolic
network to be achieved that would be difﬁcult to achieve with
either mutations or knockouts. Our approach of using a transient
decryption key can be applied to metabolic engineering. For any
given pathway, there is an optimal ﬂux distribution that
maximizes the production of a given target compound. By
transiently adding and removing a dCas9-gRNA plasmid key to
modulate the expression of the different pathway components,
a strain can be transiently engineered to achieve this optimum.
This is an ideal situation whereby the strain only has
commercial value when it is de-camouﬂaged and functioning,
while the stored un-engineered base strain would likely have
substantially less commercial value.
Discussion
We have presented two strategies for hiding the design of syn-
thetic gene circuits—circuit scrambling and circuit camouﬂage,
forms of encryption and steganography, respectively—and
experimental demonstrations of both concepts. These approaches
cover two general strategies: structural modulation of the DNA
and targeted modulation of gene expression, respectively. These
approaches can also respectively be considered as digital and
analog strategies for obfuscation of the circuit, in the sense that
structurally rearranging the DNA is all or nothing, while
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Fig. 5 Uncamouﬂaging using incorrect keys. The camouﬂaged circuit is re-drawn. gRNA targeting positions are shown as a red bar. gRNAs e+ g form the
correct key, used in Fig. 2. Numbers next to the promoters and ORFs denote the number of potential gRNA-binding sites (i.e., sequences adjacent to an
NGG PAM). Histograms show GFP output from incorrect keys. Cell induced with +aTc are represented as red histograms, cells induced with +IPTG are
represented as blue histograms. Each experiment was performed in triplicate—each histogram represents one biological replicate
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-07144-7 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |          (2018) 9:4942 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-07144-7 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 7
regulation of gene expression with CRISPRi is generally graded.
We demonstrated the strategies of circuit scrambling and circuit
camouﬂage on two different functional circuits, an AND gate and
bi-stable switch, respectively. The strategies may have effects on
circuit function. For example, our de-camouﬂaged bi-stable
switch displayed different quantitative behaviors compared with
the version without any camouﬂaging genes added. With circuit
scrambling, the additional DNA from recombinase sites placed
between promoters and ORFs can affect transcription and
translation. Furthermore, decoy components that are not excised
in circuit scrambling could interact with the real components.
Finally, knockdown of camouﬂaging genes is not absolutely efﬁ-
cient, and thus even weak links between regulators in a circuit
may affect the overall circuit performance in subtle ways. These
effects are likely to be unnoticeable when only qualitative
dynamics are important, but may become apparent if precise
quantitative dynamics are required. To prevent this issue, circuits
should be optimized in the uncamouﬂaged state, rather than in
the original form.
The utility of circuit scrambling is limited to the scrambling of
a circuit to offer protection when the circuit (or a strain engi-
neered with a circuit) is either being stored, or transferred to
another party (for instance between collaborators). Circuit
camouﬂage is arguably the superior method as it is currently the
simplest to implement and allows for the circuit to be re-hidden,
which may be useful for ﬁeld applications where re-starting from
a frozen or dried stock is impractical. The number of combina-
tions is numerically better than circuit scrambling (equal to 2n,
compared to typically ≤2n) and will likely result in more plausible
(but incorrect) candidates because of an increased number of
regulatory links. In our AND gate example, we considered how
different candidates could be made to appear more plausible with
circuit scrambling, but these techniques are unlikely to apply in
the general case and each scrambling will therefore need to be
optimized separately. For both circuit scrambling and camou-
ﬂage, deciding between plausible circuits may be particularly
difﬁcult if the encryption/decryption or camouﬂaging/uncamou-
ﬂaging results in only a quantitative, not qualitative change. One
example is the decryption of the transfer function of a classiﬁer
circuit where the topology remains the same, but the “weights” on
the links (i.e., the regulatory strength between the genes) are
modiﬁed. A “quantitative” encryption is harder to implement
with circuit scrambling, as different candidates will typically be
qualitatively different. For both approaches, creating a list of
candidate circuits and then ranking them on the likelihood they
are the true circuit would most efﬁciently be done in silico. Cri-
teria that might be useful for ranking circuits (i.e. predictive of the
true circuit) could be: (1) the number and type of logic gates
formed in the circuit—particularly for circuits that are suspected
to behave digitally and perform complex functions a substantial
number of logic gates might be expected, (2) measures of the
complexity of the network structure22, for example if these can be
correlated with measures on known circuit designs, and (3) if
dynamical models of the circuits are automatically built in silico
then the dynamics of the circuit under numerical simulation can
be obtained, and a phase space and bifurcation analysis can be
performed, all which could be used in some capacity as pre-
dictors. In all cases, using prior knowledge of the application
domain of the circuit would help in ranking—for example a
circuit from a company known to classify disease states might be
expected to contain multiple stable equilibria, while one from a
company involved in measurement might contain structures that
permit more linear dose–responses23.
There is a third potential approach, re-coding the genetic
code, which aims to encrypt a circuit at the level of the genetic
code and represents another distinct strategy for encryption.
Circuit scrambling and circuit camouﬂage offer protection when
the circuit is not in use. Conceptually, an optimal scheme would
allow for the design of the circuit to remain hidden while the
circuit is still functional. Using synthetic genetic codes in which
an artiﬁcial and secret mapping from codons to amino acids
hides the identity of ORFs of the circuit is one approach that
could offer this. However, there is a potential weakness to this
approach. With circuit scrambling and camouﬂage, the circuit is
non-functional when hidden, but a circuit using a synthetic
genetic code would be functional at all times. A third party may
only be interested in obtaining the functional cells, rather than
also deciphering the design of the circuit that enables the func-
tion, and this scenario is a weakness and trade-off for the con-
venience of not requiring a decryption stage prior to use.
Encryption using circuit re-encoding allows for simultaneous
encryption and functioning of the circuit, but is technically
challenging to implement currently. Practically, a synthetic
genetic code would require orthogonal translation machinery,
speciﬁcally a set of artiﬁcial tRNAs that function only with the
codons of the synthetic code, and not with codons of endogenous
transcripts. The technology to achieve this is still being developed,
but some of the proof-of-principles have been demonstrated;24–32
Orthogonal ribosomes have already been developed that only
recognize and translate corresponding orthogonal mRNAs
through a modiﬁed Shine–Dalgarno sequence30, and using
quadruplet anti-codon tRNAs that are only incorporated by a
mutant orthogonal ribosome31 is already a viable route to
creating an orthogonal tRNA set that would allow for a user-
speciﬁc quadruplet code for each amino acid.
Biochemically characterizing the orthogonal charged tRNA-
amino acids pairs would be possible using modern biochemical
techniques and this is arguably the most vulnerable point of the
approach. One strategy could be to use a molecular key to repress
expression of members of a superset of tRNAs, leaving just the
correct set for the circuit. However, this would eliminate the
convenience of not requiring a decryption stage.
Ultimately, any encryption scheme is only as strong as its
weakest link. For instance, using a recombinase-encrypted circuit,
but maintaining the sequence of recombinases to be used for
decryption in an unsecured form, or having no security for the
plasmid containing the key in circuit camouﬂage, defeats the
purpose of the encryption. Finally, it may be beneﬁcial to com-
bine different types of protection. For instance, storing and
transferring an organism in an encrypted form, decrypting when
required, and then destroying the key (in the case of circuit
camouﬂage) or the organism’s genome, or both, with targeted
degradation after its function has been fulﬁlled3.
To date, there has only been minimal consideration of how to
technologically protect the IP of circuits encoded into engineered
cells and organisms. As the value and complexity of these entities
increases, the need for hiding the circuit design will also increase.
Here, we have presented three conceptually distinct strategies that
can form the basis of future work in this direction. We envision
that further research into this area, along with efforts to break
these systems, will help the ﬁeld of biological encryption and
steganography to advance towards practical implementations.
Methods
Strains. Escherichia coli strain MK0133 was used for the recombinase scrambling
experiments in Fig. 1. MK01 is a strain that has shown to give a gradual induction
of AraC function with arabinose and also has lacI knocked out. Escherichia coli
strain MK0233 (equivalent to MK01 but with the chloramphenicol resistance gene
removed) was used for the circuit camouﬂage experiments in Figs. 4, 5. All solid
and liquid media was Luria-Bertani (LB). Carbenicillin, kanamycin, and chlor-
amphenicol were used at a ﬁnal concentration of 50 μg/ml, 30 μg/ml, and 25 μg/ml,
respectively. L-arabinose was used at a ﬁnal concentration of 0.05% (w/v).
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Plasmids. The encrypted AND gate (pOP437) was constructed by Gibson
assembly of multiple synthesized fragments. The plasmid conferred ampicillin
resistance and had a pSC101 origin of replication. The (unencrypted) bi-stable
switch was obtained from the lab of James Collins (MIT). The stop codons of
both tetR and lacI were changed to TAA, and the existing origin of replication
was replaced with the P15A origin, to form pOP512. pOP512 conferred
kanamycin resistance. To construct a bi-stable switch capable of encryption by λCI
and araC, an OR_1-binding site for λCI was inserted between the −10 and −35
regions of the ptrC-2 promoter expressing tetR, to form pOP549. λCI and araC
were cloned into a separate plasmid (to form pOP523) with chloramphenicol
resistance and a pBBR1 origin of replication. Decryption plasmids
(pOP587–pOP594) were ampicillin resistant and contained the temperature-
sensitive origin repA101ts (from pDK46). dCas9 was constitutively expressed
from the proD promoter, and gRNAs were constitutively expressed individually
and in tandem from the promoter BBa_J23119, and with either the T0 or T1
terminator. dCas9 had no terminator. pOP576 was a control plasmid and only
contained proD-dCas9. Correspondence between plasmids and gRNA combina-
tions is as follows: pOP588 –e+ f, pOP589 – c, pOP590 – c+ d, pOP591 – a+ b,
pOP592 – a+ f+ g, pOP593 – e+ b, pOP594 – b+ f (Fig. 5).
Recombinases. Puriﬁed recombinase proteins were obtained from BlueSky
Bioservices (Worcester, MA). Conditions for recombination were adapted
from Ghosh et al.14. The buffer comprised 20 mM Tris-HCL pH7.5, 10 mM
EDTA, 25 mM NaCl, 10 mM Spermidine, 1 mM DTT (added fresh each time),
and 0.1 mg/ml BSA.
Recombination experiments. For recombination, typically 1 μl of recombinase
was added to 19 μl of recombination buffer, to which ~10 ng of plasmid was then
added. Reactions were carried out at either 30 or 37 °C, typically overnight. An
aliquot of this mixture was then transformed into E. coli DH5alpha cells to pro-
pagate the plasmids.
AND gate characterization. The decrypted AND gate (Fig. 2, step 1) and the gate
at decryption steps 2, 3, and 4 (Fig. 2) correspond to plasmids pOP437, pOP440,
pOP447, and pOP458, respectively. Each plasmid was transformed into
MK01 cells. Three colonies were picked and grown overnight at 37 °C in LB with
carbenecillin. Fresh cultures were inoculated with overnight cultures (1:100 dilu-
tion), induced with a ﬁnal concentration of 1 mM IPTG and arabinose, grown at
37 °C to mid-log and then analyzed on a BD LSRfortessa II Flow cytometer with a
488 nm laser. All histograms are from >5000 cells. Typical gating used is shown in
Supplementary Figure 2.
Bi-stable switch and circuit camouﬂage experiments. Bi-stable switch experi-
ments (Figs. 1, 2) were performed as follows: MK02 cells were transformed with
pOP512. Three colonies were picked and grown overnight at 30 °C in LB with
appropriate selection and arabinose. Fresh cultures inoculated at a 1:1000 dilution
were then induced with either aTc or IPTG, at ﬁnal concentrations of 250 ng/ml
and 1 mM respectively, and grown overnight in appropriate selection and arabi-
nose. 500 μl of each culture was then removed and centrifuged at 10×g. The
supernatant was then removed, the pellet re-suspended in 500 μl of 1× PBS, and
then used to inoculate (1:1000) a fresh culture, without inducer, which was grown
overnight at 30 °C in appropriate selection and arabinose. Cells were then analyzed
on a BD LSRfortessa II Flow cytometer with a 488 nm laser. All histograms are
from >5000 cells. Typical gating used is shown in Supplementary Figure 2
Uncamouﬂaging was performed as follows: MK02 cells were previously co-
transformed with pOP549 and pOP523 to form the camouﬂaged bi-stable
switch strain (opf35). Competent opf35 cells were then transformed by heat shock
with either the control (pOP576) or gRNA-containing plasmid (pOP587–pOP594)
and grown overnight at 30 °C on solid media with appropriate selection. Data for
the camouﬂaged bi-stable switch was generated from opf35 streaked out from the
same competent cell batch used for transformation with the pOP587 decryption
plasmid. From each transformation, three colonies were picked and the assay
protocol then followed the bi-stable switch protocol described above.
Re-camouﬂaging continued on from uncamouﬂaging as follows: cells from each
of the three cultures were streaked out on LB plates with kanamycin and
chloramphenicol selection and grown overnight at 42 °C. Corresponding mini-
streakouts of three colonies from each plate were then made on both LB+
kanamycin/chloramphenicol and LB+ kanamycin/chloramphenicol/carbenicillin
plates. In all cases, the colonies were able to grow on LB+ kanamycin/
chloramphenicol but not on LB+ kanamycin/chloramphenicol/carbenicillin,
indicating plasmid loss. One mini-streakout from each plate was then grown
overnight at 30 °C in LB with appropriate selection and arabinose. Further steps
(induction, washing with PBS, and cytometry) were identical to the
uncamouﬂaging stage.
Data availability
Raw data for Figs. 2, 4, and 5 is available as a Mendeley data set and can be found at
https://doi.org/10.17632/n2h4sfmz4w.1. Annotated plasmid sequences are also available
as a Mendeley data set and can be found at https://doi.org/10.17632/88m95bndgm.1.
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